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Abstract: 
The main purpose of this work is to address a puzzle and suggest strategies towards 
solutions that are freedom-enhancing. The puzzles: why is there such a tendency towards 
regionalization and even nationalist protectionism despite the rhetoric of globalization, 
the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs( International Financial Institutions), and the 
recognized merits of a rules-based global system? The main argument offered is that 
there is a contradiction in the heart of the current US and the IFIs-led globalization that 
stems from their seeming refusal to understand the implications of unevenness in the real 
world. This also has led to their neglect of some vital principles of global justice. By 
ignoring issues of equity, the current leaders of globalization now risk losing economic 
efficiency if the world becomes further fragmented. Using an extension of Sen’s 
capabilities approach---called the social capabilities approach--- the role of deepening 
democracy in the global political economy is shown to be crucial in this process. 
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Chapter 1.Introduction  
Globalization as a corporate-led process has come under much justifiable criticism. This 
short book attempts to give the term analytic content distinct from its more ideological 
formulations. It then focuses on a normative analysis of globalization from the 
capabilities perspective. A freedom-centered perspective such as the capabilities 
approach emphasizes policies and institutions that can enhance freedom globally and 
locally. A global governance structure based on transparent principles of both economic 
efficiency and social justice is shown to be a desirable state of affairs; however, the 
present fractured process of globalization is more likely to end up in a fragmenting 
regionalism or even national protectionism and rivalry  
The main purpose of this book is thus to address a puzzle and suggest strategies towards 
solutions that are freedom-enhancing. The puzzles: why is there such a tendency towards 
regionalization and even nationalist protectionism despite the rhetoric of globalization, 
the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs( International Financial Institutions), and the 
recognized merits of a rules-based global system? The main argument offered is that 
there is a contradiction in the heart of the current US and the IFIs-led globalization that 
stems from their seeming refusal to understand the implications of unevenness in the real 
world. This also has led to their neglect of some vital principles of global justice. By 
ignoring issues of equity, the current leaders of globalization now risk losing economic 
efficiency if the world becomes further fragmented. Thus, my purpose is to try to 
understand ‗globalization and its discontents‘(Stiglitz 2002,2006, Khan1994, 1995a,b, 
1996,1997a,b,c,,1998,1999a,b,2004a and b,2005,2007, Khan and Liu 2008), and offer 
some guiding principles to move forward.  
With frequent use the word globalization has by now acquired the status of an academic 
cliché. For many, the twin tendencies of the globalization of production and the 
emergence of a new international division of labor represent deep structural 
transformation of the world economy. In some sense, this is clearly true. But as some 
observers have recently pointed out (Harris, 1998, Khan, 1998) the word globalization, as 
commonly used, is largely a descriptive and not an analytical category. Furthermore, as a 
4 4  
descriptive term its proper use requires a historical perspective that is often missing in the 
vast and growing literature. When viewed historically, it appears that globalization is a 
contradictory process of international economic integration that was severely interrupted 
by the first world war, the great depression, and the second world war. The emergence of 
the Bretton Woods framework can be seen as a way to integrate the world with respect to 
trade while controlling the flow of private capital. The demise of Bretton Woods has set 
in motion forces of capital account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of 
‗globalization‘. However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities as evidenced 
by the Mexican and — more recently and even more dramatically — by the Asian 
financial crisis. At the same time integration of trade even within the standard 
neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model would imply a fall in the wages of 
unskilled workers of the north thus increasing inequality there (Krugman, 1996; Wood, 
1994). The south is supposed to experience a more equalizing effect through trade; but 
empirically, there is very little evidence of this happening. Therefore, it is necessary to 
treat the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are experiencing a `fractured‘ 
globalization (Harris, 1998).  
Nevertheless, during the past few decades, the structural changes that took place in the 
world economy have brought about increased cross-border economic relations and, 
relatively speaking, a global economy. The internationalization of trade and foreign 
investment, aided by the worldwide deregulation of financial markets, has promoted 
economic integration and regional unions (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997). A new division 
of labor and a qualitatively different type of resource utilization, production and capital 
accumulation have emerged. The most significant effect of the recent structural change in 
world economy has been the creation of global interdependence and an economic global 
village.  
Although integration of the world economy is not exactly new, these structural changes 
have added up to a qualitative alteration in the organization of global markets, namely, 
one involving a shift away from international trade towards international production and 
the domination of international finance and the man-made brainpower industries 
(Thurow,1996). As Cook and Kirkpatrick (1997) put it,  
The internationalization of economic activity is not a new phenomenon...The recent 
growth in international integration is qualitatively different, however, from the earlier 
expansion of international trade, in that it has been characterized by the intensification of 
economic linkages 5 5  
that transcend national boundaries, often at the functional level (p. 55).  
In the previous years of economic integration, international trade and the reduction of 
trade barriers played the leading role in integrating the world economy while in today's 
global economy the main key players are multinational corporations and the growing 
finance and capital markets as well as information and computer technologies.  
Since the early 1980s, multinational corporations have increased not only in number but 
have also seen their share of foreign investment grow tremendously. In the early 1990s, 
there were about 37,000 multinational corporations that controlled some 170,000 
affiliates and the global stock of FDI constituted about $2 trillion (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1997). Today, some multinational corporations' turnover is greater than the GNP of some 
developing countries.  
Globalization has also been enhanced by the rising importance of the financial market 
and financial institutions that are dominating global economic relations. Deregulation of 
the financial market and liberalization of foreign exchange policies have increased the 
flow of finance between countries and brought about the integration of the world 
economy.  
As the effects of globalization and regionalisation are felt in every part of the world, 
social scientists have begun examining and debating these two concepts, their 
relationships, and the implication they are likely to have on the growth and welfare of 
developing countries. Among scholars there are clearly areas of dispute. Some scholars 
such as Hirst (1995) question whether there is such a thing as a globalized economy 
while others (Thurow, 1996; Ohmae, 1996) suggest that a qualitatively new form of 
economic integration has set the stage for the emergence of globalization and 
regionalization. Also, social scientists debate whether globalization and regionalization 
are enhancing the welfare of developing countries or marginalizing them, and thereby 
perpetuating regional and socioeconomic inequality.  
In this book I will examine the essence of globalization and regionalization, their 
relationship, and the implications they may have for developing countries in particular. I 
will also point out the contradictions between the global flows of capital and the local 
needs and sensibilities. At the end, we will see that this contradiction points to a need for 
understanding both the structural and normative aspects of globalization especially as it 
relates to development. 6 6  
Chapter 2  
Fractured Globalization Within a Normative Framework of Analysis 7 7  
As mentioned at the beginning, globalization has been the buzz-word of the 1990s. As a 
process of change, globalization extends beyond the realm of politics and economics to 
embrace science, culture and lifestyles (Griffin and Khan, 1992). As such, globalization 
is a "multi-dimensional phenomenon applicable to a variety of forms of social action--
economic, political, legal, cultural, military and technological--and sites of social action, 
such as the environment" (Perraton et al, 1997: 258).  
There is no consensus among scholars as to the definition of globalization, or its effect on 
our lives and behavior. Some scholars have attempted to explain globalization as a 
political concept (Gills, 1997) while others elucidate the concept within the framework of 
recent economic, political and environmental developments (McGrew, 1992). Some 
focus on the positive impact of globalization; still others emphasize its adverse effects on 
income and social inequality, women and the poor (Sen, 1997, Gills, 1997). Others 
underscore the impact of globalization on the nation states and argue that "nation states 
have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of 
today's borderless world" (Ohmae, 1996:11). Yet others focus on the contradictory forces 
of integration and fragmentation in a postmodern world (Khan, 1998; chapters 6 and 7, 
2002a,b, 2003, 2004a,b, 2007).  
Since globalization has significant implications for numerous nations, individuals and 
communities, it is imperative to clearly define and examine its implications. A sine qua 
non for this is to conceptualize the term clearly. In this book globalization is 
conceptualized as a set of cross-cutting economic, technological, cultural and 
communicative processes that have grown enormously since the end of WWII.. In simple 
terms globalization refers to the integration of the world economy in such a way that 
what is unfolding in one part of the world has clear, sustained and observable 
repercussions on the socioeconomic environment and lifestyles of individuals and 
communities elsewhere. As McGrew puts it, globalization is "the forging of a multiplicity 
of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the 
modern world system, as well as the process by which events, decisions and activities in 
one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and 
communities in quite distant parts of the globe" (1992, p.262). However, in order for the 
term to have genuine analytical significance it must be a part of a theory of globalization. 
Furthermore, in order for significant policy implications to emerge the theory must have a 
normative focus as well. Khan (1998) has proposed such a theory in the context of a 
postmodern world. In brief outline the structural forces in the global economy push 
towards integrating markets and regions. However, many markets are embedded in 
national economies; there are also non-market aspects of social and cultural lives of 
people that are threatened. As a result we find the contradictory phenomena of McWorld 
and Jihad (Barber, 1995). The creation of a genuine global society, which many see as the 
ultimate outcome of globalization then necessitates meeting the requirements of global 
justice. Khan (1998) mentions at least 5 areas, where the norms of global justice must 
evolve (among others):  
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric system  
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of payments which penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only them to bear the costs 
of adjustment needs to be made a global burden sharing institution. The World Trade 
Organization, similarly, needs to acknowledge the historical imbalances in the world 
trading system. For example, specialization according to static comparative advantage 
may lock the developing countries in a relatively backward situation in the emerging 
global division of labor.  
 
2. International capital flows: From the perspective of many people in the developed 
economies capital flight to LDC‘s (with or without free trade agreements) may constitute 
a barrier to well-being, at least in the short-run. At the same time foreign direct 
investment in LDCs may create only low-wage, marginal jobs (Wood, 1994). A just 
approach to FDI must consider the effects on both the north and south in terms of self-
determination. A controlled capital flow accompanied by improvements of wages and 
working conditions in the south may be the most desirable solution.  
 
3. International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has been increasingly 
recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice demands in terms of the 
relationship between the north and south. Other things being equal, the enforcement of 
strict environmental standards would seem to be just. However, such standards may 
destroy the livelihood of some people in the south, it is sometimes argued. A global tax 
and transfer scheme would seem to be the precondition for applying a global set of 
environmental standards. The transfer of ecologically sound technology systems from 
rich to the poor countries is a precondition for justice in this sphere.  
 
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing discussion 
pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal in order for them to 
develop their social capabilities. Most studies (e.g., Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Khan, 
1985; James and Khan, 1993) have discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the 
poor hampers poverty alleviation strategies. Redistributing assets and developing their 
human capital so that the poor can have access to markets becomes a major necessity in 
our normative framework. In most parts of the world this will require structural reforms 
rather than marginal policy interventions.  
 
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be assessed 
carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender inequalities that so far have 
affected women‘s capabilities negatively demand unequivocally that policymakers pay 
careful attention to enhancing (or at least not decreasing) women‘s capabilities. Will the 
globalization help women to overcome social limitations ranging from lack of nutrition to 
limits on participation in social, economic and political  
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life? Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. In so far as many developing country women 
do not possess skills for the global market place, globalization is already hurting them.  
 
These five examples are meant to be illustrative only. By no means do they exhaust all 
the pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, we could 
add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its 
implications for justice). But they do illustrate both the problems and prospects for justice 
in the age of globalization. One of the major political problems we have not discussed so 
far is the weakening of national sovereignty that the call for global economic justice 
entails. Agreeing to a global mode of production and distribution constrained by the 
principles of justice does mean surrendering considerable authority to international 
agreements, conventions, and ultimately, perhaps to new international organizations. It 
should be observed, however, that even without the constraining role of justice the 
globalization process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized 
countries (e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as well as 
other issues such as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in the 
light of reasonable principles. The fundamental message is that among these principles 
that of freedom as rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal one. This is 
one rational (perhaps the only one) approach if we are to avoid both the Scylla of Jihad 
and the Charybdis of McWorld.  
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real economic, 
financial and technological integration. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including interest rates and exchange 
rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of capital between nations. Until then 
the world financial system was governed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 which 
provided for fixed exchange rate where currency values were expressed in terms of 
dollars and gold. When the system was abolished in 1971 by the Nixon administration 
and replaced by a floating exchange rate, the grounds for a global market were laid.  
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that became the "only game in town" 
following the ascendance of political conservatives -- Reagan in the U.S., and Thatcher in 
Great Britain. It was further reinforced by the collapse of the former socialist countries 
and the emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of 
thought (Falk, 1997). All these factors created a conducive environment for the free 
movement of goods including capital goods, and services as well as finance, thereby 
seemingly creating an integrated global economy. In Khan(2003) the causes of this 
fractured and contradictory but nonetheless integrating moment in the world economy are 
analyzed in detail. Here we take the process as given and ask why it is not working so 
well as its proponents have claimed by considering the implications for developing 
countries in particular. For a more extensive discussion covering the developed world as 
well Stiglitz(2006) is a good guide. 10 10  
Chapter 3  
A Social Capabilities Ethics for Global Economic Justice 11 11  
Siglitz and others have made a serious contribution towards understanding the problems 
of neoliberalism in our world. What we can attempt here is to integrate this positive 
analysis with the normative position towards globalization and global economic justice as 
sketched in this essay earlier. Some traditional economic approaches to normativity via 
ordinal or cardinal utilitarianism is too narrow as Sen and others have pointed out. The 
Rawlsian primary goods approach goes much further but also falls short of a 
comprehensive integration of positive and normative aspects in a world of diverse 
cultural and political traditions(Sen 1992, Khan 1998). The capabilities approach can be 
proposed as an alternative. Nussbaum(1995) proposes an "Aristotlean" approach with 
lists of capabilities. Sen has been somewhat reluctant to endorse a particular list once and 
for all. The "Hegelian" social capabilities approach suggested by Khan(1998, 2003) 
endorses a certain open-endedness with respect to a list but emphasizes the irreducible 
social, economic and political institutional context of capabilities in a dynamic, historical 
setting.1 Keeping these important qualifications in mind, an illustrative list is 
nevertheless helpful in concretizing discussions regarding capabilities ethics.  
1 See below for further references and elaborations.  
2 For example, Schur-concave SWFs are such ―equality preferring‖ SWFs.  
3 See Khan (1998; 1997c).  
In the particular context of globalization of finance, for example, sound finance and 
economic growth may go together under an appropriately designed global economic 
regime. However, the results of growth must still be evaluated from the point of view of 
human well-being. In the standard utilitarian approach this can be done by choosing an 
appropriate social welfare function(SWF) where both levels of income and the 
distribution of income are arguments. Given a preference for equality at a given level of 
income, technically certain SWFs are the only admissible ones.2  
A more elaborate evaluation of well-being has been proposed by various theorists 
drawing upon the insights of Adam Smith. Sen is the originator of this ―capabilities 
approach‖ in recent times. As mentioned above, the theoretical criticisms of the utilitarian 
approach by Sen Nussbaum and others that this approach reduces all qualities into quanta 
of utilities is a serious one. Nussbaum gives a graphic example of this by quoting the 
exchange between Mr. Gradgrind, economist and grief-stricken father, and his pupil 
Bitzer. Bitzer outdoes his mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality that 
cannot comprehend a father's grief. I have pursued a similar line of criticism in a number 
of recent papers, and in my book ―Technology, Development and Democracy3. This 
approach makes the capabilities explicitly social and asks: what concatenation of 
economic (real and financial ) and other (e.g., political, social etc.) institutions will allow 
capabilities to be both increase steadily on the average and tend to equalize them among 
diverse individuals? In effect, as the following discussion makes clear, we are asking: 
how can we increase and equalize real, positive freedom for individuals?  
In discussing the well-being implications of sound global finance in particular and 
globalization in general, therefore, I wish to take a version of the social capabilities 
approach. It is not my intention here to present detailed empirical indicators of well-being 
and how these are affected by the crisis and its aftermath. This is the subject of a future 
volume. Here I simply wish to pose clearly the conceptual 12 12  
problem of evaluating the consequences of reforms. The institutional reforms and 
changes proposed here, and by scholars who suggest alternative structures , must be 
proven to be capability enhancing, or at least not to be capability-reducing..But first we 
still need to ask: What is meant by capabilities both abstractly and concretely?  
Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind that can be 
acquired, maintained, nurtured and developed. They can also (under circumstances such 
as malnutrition or severe confinement) be diminished and even completely lost. I have 
emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social (not merely biological) character of these 
human capabilities. Sen himself emphasizes "a certain sort of possibility or opportunity 
for functioning.  
In order to assess financial reforms and structures from a capabilities perspective we need 
to go further and try to describe more concretely what some of the basic capabilities may 
be. David Crocker has given an admirable summary of both Nussbaum's and Sen's 
approach to capabilities in a recent essay. Mainly relying on Nussbaum but also on other 
sources (shown below), he has compiled a list that is worth reproducing here:  
Basic Human Functional Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", 
respectively; the quoted items come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted).  
1. Capabilities in Relation to Mortality  
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is possible  
1.2. 1.2. N: Being able to be courageous  
 
2. Bodily Capabilities  
2.1. N and S: "Being able to have good health.  
2.2. 2.2. N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished.  
2.3. N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter  
2.4. 2.4. N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction"  
 
2.5. N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place  
3. Pleasure  
3.1. N and S: "Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have 
pleasurable experiences  
4. Cognitive Virtues  
4.1. N: "Being able to use the five senses"  
4.2. N: "Being able to imagine"  
4.3. N: "Being able to think and reason"  
4.4. N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed/  
5. Affiliation I (Compassion)  
5.1. N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves"  
5.2. N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude"  
6. Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency)  
6.1. N: "Being able to form a conception of the good  
S: "Capability to choose ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values  
6.2. N and S: "Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own 
life" 13 13  
7. Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice)  
7.1. N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction"  
7.1.1. N: Being capable of friendship  
S: Being able to visit and entertain friends  
7.1.2. S: Being able to participate in the community  
7.1.3. N: Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice  
8. Ecological Virtue  
8.1. N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the 
world of nature"  
9. Leisure  
9.1. N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities"  
10. Separateness  
10.1. N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's  
10.2. N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context"  
11. Self-respect  
11.1. S: "Capability to have self-respect"  
11.2. S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame"  
12. Human Flourishing  
12.1. N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by 
natural possibilities"  
12.2. S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings"  
To facilitate this ordering, it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to 
"infuse" but not "organize" the other virtues. Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach 
with Sen's. Sen's and Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points. For Sen, the bodily 
capabilities and functionings (2) are intrinsically good and not, as they are in some 
dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental means to other (higher) goods. In 
interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily functionings that are 
chosen and intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that 
form part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion 
and other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep" (forthcoming). She may want to say 
that intentional bodily actions that lead to being well-nourished and healthy are 
intrinsically good, but that being healthy or having good digestion are not functionings 
(because not intentional) and are valuable only because of what they enable us to do. 
Another option open to her would be to adopt Sen's view that bodily states and processes, 
whether intentional or not, both as intrinsically and instrumentally good but as less 
valuable than other inherently good capabilities/functionings.  
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items 5 and 8-10, for which Sen has no 
counterparts. These items are welcome features. Item 8, which I have called "ecological 
virtue", is an especially important recent addition to Nussbaum's outlook. In a period 
when many are 14 14  
exploring ways of effecting a convergence between environmental ethics and 
development ethics, it is important that an essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" 
for respect for other species and for ecological systems. Worth considering is whether 
Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough. Perhaps it should be formulated to read: 
"Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as 
intrinsically valuable." Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise 
marked by the "spirit of seriousness." What explains the presence of these items on 
Nussbaum's list, their absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete 
texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions? One hypothesis is that the 
differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention, in her Level 1, to the limits, 
vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence. Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer 
conception of human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far 
more than the scientific intellect." On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of 
self-respect, a virtue that enables him to find common ground with Rawls and to establish 
links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral agents have the obligation to 
respect all persons, including themselves, as ends-in-themselves.  
Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central 
importance. One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another. At 
most, one can do so in a very limited way. They cannot be reduced to a common measure 
such as utility.  
As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and justice 
going far beyond simple distribution of income considerations. If one accepts the 
capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows that 
going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the impact of 
economic policies.  
In evaluating international financial regimes and national economic policies from this 
perspective not only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set 
of questions regarding human freedom. In particular, the positive human freedom to be or 
to do certain things. Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by itself would 
mean very little if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits. Worse yet, if markets and 
other institutions led to phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased 
unemployment, reduced consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups 
such as women and minorities then they will not even be weakly equitable global 
economic structure. On the contrary, under such circumstances, the global markets and 
other financial institutions will be strongly inequitable from the capability perspective.  
It is because of this perspective that the earlier positive analysis of the problems of global 
financial markets and institutions need to be put in a completely transparent ―social 
capabilities‖ framework. Such a framework is openly normative and makes a strong 
ethical case for helping the disadvantaged increase their capabilities towards achieving 
equality of capabilities. Thus poorer nations and poor people in the global economy 
deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global financial architecture. As 
Khan(1998) shows in the context of adopting innovation structures leading to increased 
productivities, ultimately the aim of any increase in productivity needs to be the increase 
of freedom. Such freedom, as Sen (1999) points out has both an instrumental value and 
an ultimate value. Instrumentally, freedom as social capabilities can lead to a further 
increase in productivity. Thus even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis must address 
this aspect as an empirically relevant issue. 15 15  
The thrust of this book so far has been to show how bad theories---- regardless of their 
ideological leanings, left, right or center---- can lead to bad policies. Likewise, a refusal 
to face up to serious ethical issues of equity and well-being for all can also lead to a 
troubled society. As we move towards the creation of a global society where individuality 
and rich diversity reflected in differences of cultures and social practices leading to well-
being are equally respected, we can do no less than a genuine attempt to approach the 
reforming of old financial structures and building new financial institutions with a clear 
ethical perspective of global citizenship. Efficiency and equity are both important and 
sometimes can be achieved together. At other times at least short run trade offs must be 
considered carefully. Here, the advances in economic theory --- both positive and 
normative--- can play a modest but useful role. Therefore, In the realm of crisis 
prevention and crisis management, the minimization of costs and the maximization of the 
benefits from any financial system must be guided by advances in both positive economic 
theories and in economic ethics. The next two sections discuss some of the implications 
of globalization generally for the developing countries and a particular example, namely 
the Asian financial crisis. From both the general and the particular considerations, the 
main thesis regarding the dangers of a naïve neoliberal approach is confirmed. 
Furthermore, the need for policies that are (social) capabilities-enhancing is also 
confirmed.  
Chapter 4  
Implications for Developing Countries 16 16  
Regarding the intense discussion on the effect of globalization on the welfare and 
economic growth of developing countries, the dominant view appears to be that closer 
economic integration will enhance the flow of goods and services as well as factors of 
production, and hence promote economic growth and the welfare of all people. It is 
believed that globalization will result in a better division of labor, allowing developing 
countries (where labor is abundant) to specialize in labor intensive commodities while 
permitting developed countries to use their workers in more productive ways (The 
Economist, 1997a). It is also argued that globalization will allow capital to move in 
accordance with the productive investment opportunities and thereby increase the returns 
to capital.  
Others (Falk, 1997; Khan, 1996; Sen, 1997, Sen 1999 Stiglitz 2002,2006) reject this 
argument and contend that globalization and regionalization has largelyl benefited the 
powerful economic entities, thereby marginalizing weak regions and nations. It is argued 
that globalization, while increasing the importance of service industries and skilled labor, 
also reduces the importance of primary commodities and unskilled labor. The revolution 
made in biotechnology, microelectronics and the like have eroded the importance of raw 
materials. Consequently, countries which were once considered wealthy, endowed with 
natural resources, are no more in the list of rich countries. It is no wonder that, today, the 
richest man in the world is Bill Gates, the owner of Microsoft. The advancement made in 
technology has not only changed the structure of inputs but it also changed their 
significance. Modern industries use fewer natural resources and as a result their 
importance has fallen out of the competitive equation. In modern economy, technology, 
knowledge and skills stand as the only source of comparative advantage (Thurow, 1996). 
Such a scenario puts developing countries, the main exporters of primary goods and 
unskilled labor, in a very disadvantageous position.  
Moreover, globalization is already forcing developing countries to operate in accordance 
with the discipline of the global market, limiting the effectiveness of their national 
development policies(Khan 1998,2004a and b,Chang 2007. Bonvin (1997) It has been 
known for quite some time by economists that the autonomy and effectiveness of national 
economic policy disappear when there is unrestricted capital flows across borders.  
Furthermore, the growth in the global financial market and highly mobile private funds 
are weakening the ability of countries' central banks to manage exchange rates and design 
effective and sound macroeconomic policies ( Khan2004b,UNCTAD 2006,2007).  
Thus in terms of both growth and distribution the developing countries as awhole are 
losing out. The success of China and earlier the East Asian economies was based on 
strategic integration where national trade, industrial and financial policies were relatively 
autonomous. Ironically, China--- where inequalities have grown remarkably during the 
high growth period and domestic demand can be expanded by using reserves--- is now 
supporting finance the profligate spending patterns of the very rich in the richest country 
of the world by buying an enormous amount of low-yielding US government bonds. 
There are systemic reasons for this but it can not be denied that this ararngemenbt has 17 
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given the global economy as a whole a deflationary bias and have kept the standard of 
living inside China low, not allowing the poorer segments to benefit equally from the 
remarkable growth over almost three decades. The real dangers of Western corporate 
interest led globalization was brought home when once successful East Asian economies 
liberalized their financial markets in the 1990s, only to face the most severe financial 
crisis(Khan2004 and b; Stiglitz2002,2006). China and India survived the crisis mainly 
because they had refused to liberalize their capital accounts.  
An Example of the Contradictions of Globalization : From Asian Miracle to the 
Asian Debacle during the Asian Financial Crisis  
An illustration of the instabilities inherent in the forces of financial integration sweeping 
over the globe is the recent financial crises that began in Southeast Asia and later 
engulfed Korea. To some extent the Japanese recession and debt overhang also worsened 
because of the developments in Southeast Asia and Korea. A disintoxicated view of the 
Asian miracle and globalization is necessary in order to put the crisis and its implications 
in perspective.  
A brief recapitulation of the crisis will show that the Thai crisis that began on July 2, 
1997 and the subsequent contagion effects were all results of a number of factors present 
in various degrees in all the affected economies. These factors include but are not limited 
to a de facto fixed exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar, short-term borrowing and 
loans to dubious ventures in sectors such as real estate. The export slow down of 1996 
had already created balance of trade deficits. When speculative attacks against currencies 
such as Baht, Ringgit and Rupiah began the central banks could no longer defend these 
currencies. But the crises that erupted were not simple currency crises. Soon the banking 
sector was affected. First there was illiquidity and finally insolvency for a large number 
of banks and other financial institutions. Eventually, the real economies were affected, 
most severely in case of Indonesia. In that country the economic crisis led to a full blown 
political crisis ending the thirty year rule by Suharto.  
There is broad agreement now as to how to characterize the crisis. As Jomo (1998) and 
Khan(2004b) have pointed out, the debate between the IMF and its critics over the 
adjustment programs in these countries revealed many disagreements. However, in the 
policy debates some basic issues regarding the role of globalization in precipitating the 
crisis had not been addressed adequately.  
The region as a whole grew rapidly beginning in the mid-1980s. Devaluations and 
relaxation of rules for foreign investment in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand attracted foreign direct investment (FDI). Fortunately, the high value of the 
Japanese yen (endaka) after the Plaza accord pushed many Japanese companies abroad. 
Some of the Japanese FDI found its way to Southeast Asia.  
It was observed even during the crisis that the fundamentals were sound in Southeast 
Asia (Khan 2002a,b,c,d,e). In other words, fiscal balances were in order, monetary policy 
was not loose and inflation was not high. However, the export-led 18 18  
growth in Southeast Asia was also accompanied by bubbles in real estate and financial 
markets. The property and construction booms as well as the stock market booms 
essentially fed on themselves. The expectations of even higher gains tomorrow brought 
on the high prices and investments today. When this giddy momentum of helplessly 
escalating absurdity collapsed, the direction reversed suddenly and precipitously. The 
rhetoric of boom, which was not only banal but also complacent, was replaced by an 
equally banal rhetoric of doom.  
In these one sided, linear narratives history progresses unidirectionally. However, the 
logic of globalization, as we have been at pains to point out, is much more complex. The 
Asian example shows how unleashing too many market forces at once — in particular, 
liberalizing capital accounts without prudential and other regulations and the ability to 
enforce them can lead to disaster and chaos.  
There are similarities as well as differences between the Mexican crisis and the Asian 
crisis. In both cases there were free falling currencies. In both Latin America and in 
Southeast Asia there were also serious contagion effects. However, one crucial difference 
between the two cases is that the collapse of the Mexican peso and the ‗Tequila effect‘ it 
produced did not lead to the kind of selling off of assets as in the Asian case. The Latin 
American crisis did not develop into a full scale debt-deflation.  
Therefore, the Asian crisis was not just a balance of payments crisis. It was as noted 
before a currency crisis that developed into a full scale and massive debt deflation and 
depression in the real sectors of the economy. One way to characterize this new type of 
currency crisis plus debt deflation is to view these as international capital market failures 
that are the logical results of the currene corporate-led globalization. In the first instance, 
globalized international capital markets have failed to allocate capital optimally — 
contrary to the neoclassical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. As Alan 
Greenspan blandly pointed out during the crisis: `In retrospect, it is clear that more 
investment money flowed into these economies than could be profitably employed at 
modest risk‘ (Greenspan, 1997: 1-2). In the second place the banking system in the 
private enterprise sectors failed to absorb and channel the large foreign capital inflows. In 
Stiglitz‘s metaphor the banking system — more generally the financial system — failed 
to act as the brain of the economic system. In other words, it failed to monitor and 
evaluate risk effectively. Clearly, the lessons from the history of the past crises have not 
been learned as the most recent developments such as the subprime loans crisis that are 
related to financial deregulation in the advanced countries indicate. 19 19  
Interestingly, the above discussion of the Asian crisis reveals in the East and Southeast 
Asian context the paradoxes of globalization that I have emphasized in this essay. As 
Sobhan (1989) and others have pointed out capitalism in developing countries has been 
led by the state to a large extent. However, the same states that had been instrumental in 
creating a modicum of successful capitalist economies, now seem powerless in the face 
of globalization. This paradoxical situation requires further elaboration.  
In the developing economies of Asia, for instance, the state is often called upon to build 
the infrastructure for capitalist development. In many cases, the domestic capitalists grow 
as a class with the active support of the state apparatus which they control to a large 
extent. The paradox of Asian development is that the state was quite successful in doing 
this up to a point. But the limits reached by this state-led capitalist development are also 
clear now.  
In the 1990s the developing countries in Asia accounted for roughly half of global 
expansion. However, growing by exports also made these economies open to pressures 
for liberalizing the capital markets. For South Korea, which was going to join the OECD 
group such liberalization was seen as a sine qua non. For the other Southeast Asian 
countries the combination of the flow of FDI and finance capital in the emerging markets 
funds seemed to justify further liberalization. A regime of fixed exchange rates and 
orthodox fiscal and monetary policies had already given credibility to these markets. Yet, 
the state — it turns out — can not protect the domestic capitalists in globalized markets 
as it could before. The so-called `crisis of governance‘ (Jomo, 1998) is really a crisis of 
the underdeveloped state apparatus which is virtually powerless to deal with the forces of 
globalization. Thus asymmetries in global economic and political power once again are 
revealed sharply. The uneven development of the real and financial sectors are also 
exposed to the scrutiny of the global investors. As confidence in the financial markets 
collapse, and investors flee with herdlike tenacity the weak states can do very little to 
shore up their domestic capital markets. As Siamwalla (1997) commented ruefully there 
were no alternatives for countries like Thailand to submitting to the onerous IMF 
conditions because of this type of failure of the Thai state and the Thai bourgeoisie. 
Given the complex relationship between the bureaucrats, politicians and business in 
Thailand (Krongkaew, 1997) it was unlikely that a coherent response to the crisis could 
emerge quickly. Under a different setting, the same crisis of governance under 
globalization continues in many countries.  
In all this, the most important factor is the uneven development of the state apparatus in 
global capitalism. For example, in many Asian countries bureaucrats guiding and 
supervising experts in various specialized areas became relatively efficient at their jobs 
and — partly because of this — quite powerful. At the same time, many of these same 
countries did not have highly proficient experts and powerful bureaucracies for the 
banking and financial sectors. Even in cases such as Thailand where the central bank had 
a reputation for technocratic ability, the bureaucrats found themselves paralyzed in the 20 
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face of liberalized markets with new institutions such as BIBF (Bangkok International 
Banking Facility) (Lauridsen, 1998).More recent crises such as the Argentine crisis and 
the rapidly developing global subprime loans crisis illustrate the same type of problems 
of rapid liberalization without adequate social supervision and economic regulation.  
Another Example: the global crisis of 2007- Present  
Despite the initial bafflement as the world economy was hit by the biggest financial crisis 
since the Great Depression, by now there is broad agreement on the underlying causes of 
the crisis: banks and financial institutions indulged in excessive leverage and excessive 
risk taking while regulators did not provide an adequate regulatory framework. In the US, 
the proximate causes also included the Fed policy under Alan Greenspan of supporting an 
artificial housing boom after the bursting of the stock market bubble through low interest 
rates and lax regulations in the housing and financial sectors in particular. Through 
various channels, the crisis was transmitted to other sectors of the economy and to 
nations across the world, leading to significant human development impacts on the poor 
and vulnerable. As the ―Stiglitz Commission report‖( the Report of the Commission of 
Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System), among other sources, emphasizes, the 
deeper causes relate to historic reversal of post-depression checks and balances of 
national and global economic governance.  
As the Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations 
General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System put it:  
―…the standard policy nostrums—that countries should have sound macroeconomic 
policies strong governance, transparency, and good institutions – may be less than 
helpful. Countries that held themselves out as models of best practices have been shown 
to have had deeply flawed macroeconomic policies and institutions and to have suffered 
from major shortfalls in transparency.‖  
Against this backdrop, there have been many calls for changes in the global financial and 
economic governance architecture that would lead to a more stable and less risky 
international financial system. For example, internationally, there is momentum around 
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BASEL III, a package of proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations. 
The United States government has recently introduced legislation aimed at reforming 
financial institutions under its jurisdiction.  
While these processes are underway, the crisis itself continues to evolve. For example, 
some emerging economies face concerns about excessive financial inflows and 
overheating of their economies. On the other hand, several countries now face (or 
anticipate) debt sustainability issues of different degrees of severity. Among the IFIs, the 
IMF has played a prominent role through several measures including the establishment of 
flexible credit lines, changes in conditions attached to emergency funding and, more 
recently, in its interventions to support the Euro-zone economies. At the same time, 
several regional arrangements, such as currency swap lines, have also been put into place. 
Whether global or regional mechanisms are more useful in preventing financial contagion 
and to what extent these complement each other, remain open questions.  
Changes in the world financial and economic order have consequences for developing 
countries directly, through banking regulations and global/regional policies, and also 
indirectly through the impact on developed countries themselves, which can affect 
lending, foreign investments as well as international aid. In this context, it is possible to 
find the motivations for undertaking a study that will examine the principal changes that 
have taken place (or are likely to take place) as a result of the financial and economic 
crisis. These changes can also include alterations in financial and economic governance 
mechanisms and policies given the general economic context in which countries, in 
particular developing countries, are operating.  
I have documented analyzed the nature and scope of these principal changes for the 
UNDP and in academic papers, and have pointed out their consequences for developing 
countries in particular. I have also explored the important policy space issue by exploring 
analytically the conditions for their most effective responses. Without being exhaustive, 
the developments covered include:  
implications for the developing world in particular.  
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  BIS proposals for better regulation of financial derivatives, including commodities 
futures, by moving away from OTC transactions towards organized exchanges.  
evolving nature of its role.  
experiences with such arrangements in this and prior episodes of crisis.  
 
What is relevant to mention in this book is that the globalization of trade and finance by 
which was meant the unfettered operation of these markets---especially the financial 
markets was directly responsible. The imperial hegemomy under which this type of 
globalization took place remains indicted as millions of people all over the world 
continue to suffer. 23 23  
Ch. 5  
Globalization, Crisis and the deepening of Democracy in Bangladesh 24 24  
5.1 Crisis and Democracy  
In times of crisis, it is an almost irresistible temptation to make a pessimistic prognosis. 
Such pessimism is associated with an attitude that is supposed to reveal a hard headed 
realist approach to the messy world of politics and economics. However, much of the 
hand wringing and dire predictions do not rely on anything beyond a generally dark and 
pessimistic outlook. Tragically, if there is enough darkness of outlook among large 
numbers of people, the dire predictions can become self-fulfilling. To avoid such tragedy, 
a sober, analytical approach that makes the best humanly possible attempt to take into 
account all sides of a complex crisis is necessary. It is also useful to look at the present in 
light of reasonable social scientific theories and an adequate historical perspective.  
This short chapter can not offer the depth or breadth that will be necessary to deal with 
the crisis of democracy in Bangladesh in all its various details. However, I will make a 
serious and sincere attempt to alert the readers to the above two requirements of a 
realistic analysis of the problems by offering enough details to suggest solutions that will 
be viable in the long run. The problems of democracy demand more, not less democracy-
-- the great American philosopher John Dewey reminded his audience many years ago. 
Dewey was writing at a time of deepening crisis in post WWI Western world when 
fascism was threatening democracy in an ominously aggressive and militant manner. 
Like Dewey, I will argue in this time of grave crisis in Bangladesh that what we need and 
can work towards is a deeper form of democracy in Bangladesh. Since others have 
already written informatively about the current situation, I will not spend much time on 
these details. Rather, I will ask the question: what are the deepest roots of the current 
crisis? Based on at least a partially adequate answer to the question we can move forward 
towards at least a partially adequate solution. But before engaging in such an analysis it is 
important to remind ourselves of some of the underlying strengths of Bangladeshi 
society, even as people despair, or perhaps especially as they despair.  
The main purpose of this cahpter then, is to offer an analysis of the deepening crisis of 
democracy in Bangladesh that can contribute towards building a movement for 
sustainable democracy in the future. I try to do this by drawing upon and applying a 
somewhat novel theory of deep democracy from a political and social economy 
perspective. The theory of deep democracy presented here makes a distinction between 
formal aspects of democracy and the deeper structural aspects. In order for democracy to 
be deep, democratic practices have to become institutionalized in such a way that they 
become part of normal life in a democratic society. Cluster conditions for deep 
democracy include both cultural-political and socio-economic conditions. The interest in 
this paper is on applying the theory to find the concrete conditions for the viability and 
sustainability of democracy in Bangladesh beyond the crisis solving mode of behavior4  
4 . The interested reader is referred to Khan ( 1992;1993 
a,b;1994;1998,2003 and 2007). In Frame and Khan(2007) the authors we 
develop the idea of moving towards deep 1  
democracy in the context of important failures of both capitalism and 
socialism in the last century.  
5 For an elaboration of the specific arguments for deep democracy and its theoretical 
structure, please see Khan(1992,1994,1998, 2003,2007) and Frame(2007) and Khan and 
Frame(2007) where we discuss in greater detail the economic and political dimensions of 
deep democracy.  
6 Thus, readers who are pressed for time or are less theoretically inclined can skim this 
part.  
The chapter is structured as follows. After offering a brief description of the background 
to the current crisis in the next section, I discuss some of the strengths of Bangladesh as 
promised in the second paragraph above . The section that follows outlines some of the 
present and persistent difficulties. Thus a realistic assessment of the problems and 
prospects for democracy in Bangladesh becomes possible. I then offer a set of questions 
that outline the minimal conditions for revitalizing democratic politics . Going further, I 
then discuss the meaning of the political and social economy approach to deep 
democracy as I use this term.5 The deepening of democracy in Bangladesh, it is argued, 
is the only way of preserving and sustaining democracy there in the long run.6  
5.2. A Brief Background:  
As alluded to in the introduction, Bangladesh‘s political system remains highly fragile. In 
its 2007 democracy index, the Economist Intelligence Unit characterized Bangladesh as 
one of 54 ―flawed democracies‖ worldwide on the basis of several indicators, including 
electoral politics, functioning of government, and civil liberties . In Bangladesh, elections 
tend to create immense civil unrest. Leaders of the two main political parties, the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), invoke countrywide 
hartals (general strikes), which paralyze Bangladesh‘s already delicate economy for days 
or weeks at a time. Bangladesh‘s elections produce considerable violence. During the 
2001 election cycle, nearly 400 people were reported killed and over 17,000 injured, 
mainly in street clashes between supporters of rival parties. In 2007 also many election-
related deaths and hundreds of injuries had already been recorded before the present 
situation developed.  
The basic premise for holding free and fair elections in Bangladesh has been that 
impartial individuals will manage a ―non-party‖ caretaker government and oversee 
polling during an interim period between elected regimes. However , in practice 
Bangladeshi politics became dominated by the rivalry between the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party and the Awami League. The current crisis began when the BNP-led 
four-party coalition and the AL-led opposition fourteen-party alliance could not agree on 
the neutrality of the proposed Chief Advisor, CEC, and several members of the Election 
Commission. It could be said that President Iajuddin Ahmed fueled the crisis further by 
ignoring constitutional directives and naming himself Chief Advisor,an act unacceptable 
to the AL because he had been a political appointee of the BNP. It could be said that the 
persistence of corruption, authoritarianism and what at times seems almost like a blood 
feud between the leaders of BNP and AL 2  
underlay the complex reality that has been now temporarily resolved through means that 
are nondemocratic. But given the depth of popular disgust at the travesty of democracy 
by the political elite, the anti-corruption drive of the current regime in particular is 
understandably supported by a wide spectrum. The problem that will not go away, 
however, is that of the transition to genuine democracy in Bangladesh. Before addressing 
the complex issues raised by this problem, a few remarks on the rise of Islamist 
Extremism are called for, since this is often used as a key reason--- particularly by 
some in the donor community---- for even undemocratic rule that can suppress 
successfully the tendency of Islamist Extremism. Since Bangladesh is still highly 
dependent on Foreign Aid (which is largely misused) this is an important issue.  
It can not be denied that since the secularist days of the liberation in 1971 and the mass 
movements before that, Bangladesh‘s wayward politics has given way to rising Islamic 
fundamentalism. The BNP included two Islamist parties in its four-party coalition for the 
2001 elections. The support for those parties was statistically significant: together they 
won 20 of the 300 seats in parliament. Both have platforms expressly calling for the 
eventual dissolution of the country‘s democracy in favor of a government based on 
sharia (Islamic law). Increasingly, the activities of Islamist extremists have become a 
cause for concern. A Bangladeshi was one of five signatories to Osama bin Laden‘s 
fatwa( religious declaration) in 1998 calling for jihad on America and its allies. Within 
Bangladesh, attacks against secularist politicians (including an assassination attempt on 
Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the AL leader), journalists, and progressive citizens has occurred. 
On August 17, 2005, over 450 bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in 63 of 
Bangladesh‘s 64 governing districts. Leaflets were found in many of the bombing sites 
calling for the abrogation of Bangladesh‘s constitution and installation of a sharia-based 
government. The groups that claimed responsibility—Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh 
(JMB) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)—are Islamist extremists.  
Although Islamist extremists are attempting to reverse the verdict of the long struggle for 
democracy and secularism in Bangladesh, I will argue in the next section that there are 
resources within Bangladesh for a renewal of democracy which with appropriate support 
from democratic forces abroad can defeat the Islamist extremists . There is no reason for 
us to throw away the baby of democracy with the bathwater of Islamist extremism. We 
may be going through a strange baptism for our democratic future.The conflict can be 
resolved in democratic terms by strengthening the forces of democracy as I argue below.  
5.3 Internal Historical Strengths and Prospects for the Deepening of Democracy in 
Bangladesh  
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Bangladesh is not yet an unqualified failure. It has a free press. The press is not only 
formally free but is strong and established with many dedicated journalists who are 
building an important part of our civil society. In spite of serious mismanagement, the 
annual economic growth has generally been(in GDP) of 5% or higher during the last 
decade. During my time at the Asian Development Bank, I wrote several reports on the 
economic prospects of Bangladesh. On the basis of these close studies, I can write with 
some confidence about the development prospects. These are favorable once the 
obstacles that I will soon discuss are removed gradually.The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was 
awarded to Bangladesh‘s Muhammad Yunus for his innovative microcredit programs to 
help the poor establish small business ventures. Along with other efforts such as a 
successful population planning policy, initiatives like Yunus‘s Grameen Bank have 
enabled the country to outperform other developing countries in poverty reduction. 
Bangladesh is making progress towards meeting at least some of the UN‘s Millennium 
Development Goals.  
I will outline briefly these and some other strengths of Bangladesh before moving on to a 
discussion of the more serious problems that have impeded its political, economic and 
social development so far.  
Strengths of Bangladesh  
1. Relatively homogeneous population—with some important minorities whose rights 
need better protection.  
2. Largely secular & tolerant of others historically with some problems that are of largely 
post-1975 origin.  
3. A generally growing and diversifying economy with natural gas deposits ( which must 
be used properly)  
4. Good progress in communications & gradually improving physical infrastructure  
5. Success of micro finance and other poverty reduction policies, relatively speaking.  
6. Success of population control policy  
7. An increasing number of semi-skilled workers inside Bangladesh & large number of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers abroad  
8. Accumulated knowledge and experience domestically, human resources in national 
and international NGOs,in various academic and other professional fields.  
9. From a historical perspective, the popular culture, consciousness and social practices 
have on the whole been and largely remain even today free from dogmatism, rigidity and 
intolerance. For Bangalees, these negative traits have characterized to this day only a 
minority. Unfortunately, such a minority with power and means of destruction can be 
quite oppressive. However, it is only fair to say the majority of Bangalees do not support 
such destructive oppression. This statement is supported by the evidence of recent 
overwhelming support for effective anti-corruption policies.  
10. A history of struggling against superior but unjust state power both during the British 
Raj and the Pakistani regime. The fact that these struggles were successful in large part  
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suggests that Bangladesh has the resources for political renewal within the polity and 
society. However, we must ask seriously what the preconditions for such renewal are.  
 
5.4 Some Strategic Problems of Development of Democracy in Bangladesh  
 
Turning now to the problems, I will first list five problems that I consider to be of great 
strategic importance. I then discuss one issue regarding the existing political culture that 
is of strategic importance as well in moving beyond crisis-driven solutions. Finally, I 
raise ten questions which suggest some strategic areas of focus for our progressive civil 
society and political forces.  
My strategic list of problems is as follows:  
1. Problem of parliamentary constitutional politics – representative democracy and its 
limits;  
2. Problem of economic justice, class, gender, ethnic and religious minorities;  
3. Problem of social stratification & differentiation including the divide among the newly 
rich and those who are being left behind;  
4. Problem of creating a vigorous Civil Society;  
5. Problem of linking with the democratic forces internationally and delinking with the 
antidemocratic forces.  
 
All these problems have remained unsolved or very partially addressed at best in the last 
few decades for many complex historical reasons that are subjects of intense debate. 
Without engaging in this exercise (which is valuable, but not central to my purpose here), 
I want to draw attention to the problem of creating the right ―political and civic culture‖ 
without which democracy can not function anywhere in the world. I do this not because I 
believe that culture is fixed as our genes are, but in the knowledge that however difficult 
it may be to create it, such a culture is a human creation . Furthermore, there are 
indigenous resources including--- as Amartya Sen and others have emphasized--- a 
tradition of public reason and arguments.  
Probably, the best characterization of this problem at a visceral level comes from Prof. 
Ahrar Ahmad. As he puts it:  
The ―problem‖ of Bangladesh is not one about which party governs, but what political 
class most of our leaders come from, and the behavioral/attitudinal patterns they 
represent. We live in an environment of conspicuous consumption by the elite, a culture 
of arrogance, cynicism, and bullying where the ability to circumvent the laws is claimed 
as a hallmark of status and power, an atmosphere that has led to the criminalization of 
politics and the politicization of crime. Our leaders impugn the patriotism of anybody 
who disagrees with them, use the word ―conspiracy‖ as a weapon in their demagogic 
repertoire, and hound the opposition (whoever it may be) with sneering impatience and 
petty vengefulness.  
There is often a contradiction between the rhetorical flourishes they employ and the 5  
personal example they set. For instance, they will speak about the need to preserve the 
Bangla language and culture with seeming passion, but will send their children to English 
medium schools; they will cry themselves hoarse warning us about environmental crisis, 
but build high-rise buildings without any concern about their impact on urban blight; they 
will be eloquent about the need for moral clarity, but will have no problems winking their 
way through the ethical thicket of institutionalized graft and bribery; they will decry the 
politics of agitation, confrontation and brinkmanship, but engage in it themselves at the 
first opportunity; they will glorify the democratic process, but then undermine the 
parliament; they will loudly proclaim that religion is a private matter and there must be a 
wall of separation between mosque and state, but will make sure that their visit to Saudi 
Arabia and their participation in religious functions are widely publicized; they will 
forever express their solidarity with the people, but not care about the suffering their 
public policies or political strategies impose on them; they will be eloquent in defense of 
freedom of the press, but attack journalists and file cases against them if their 
investigations cut close to home; they will encourage political constancy and ideological 
commitment in others, but themselves function in a system of shabby bickering and horse 
trading, fluid alliances and fungible loyalties, and be chameleon-like in their ability to 
change color and direction depending on immediate advantage and opportunity. The 
political elite dismisses concerns about intellectual honesty or charges of hypocrisy as the 
work of, what else, ―conspirators‖. They seek power, and are not bothered that they do 
not have morel authority. There are , of course, striking and outstanding individual 
exceptions …However, generally, they have collectively helped to institute a system to 
―crony capitalism‖ through the formation of a ―klepto-patrimonial‖, rent-seeking 
predatory state, which has not ―failed‖ but has probably been ―struggling‖ for some 
time. In the hands of the same leadership class, it is destined to continue in the same 
direction. If we leave the foxes to guard the hen house, does it matter what party comes to 
power, that administrative changes are instituted, and what procedures are put in place?7  
7 Ahmad(2006), pp.32-33.  
Unless we can find credible means to change the political culture within which we 
function, and affect the attitudes, values and indulgences of our political elite, the 
viability of democracy will be doubtful. With this in mind, I now pose ten strategic 
questions that we need to answer to make the prospects for sustainable democracy 
credible.  
Some Important Questions for the Development of Democracy in Bangladesh  
1. How to offer security of life, liberty, personal property of citizens and property of 
corporate bodies in the civil society and the state?  
2. How to ensure that justice is done & that the situation does not deteriorate into cycles 
of political retribution and revenge?  
3. How to establish and preserve the integrity of the electoral process?  
4. How to make the parliamentary process effective ?  
5. How to ensure optimal social investment for infrastructure, industrial and overall  
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human development?  
6. How to make the bureaucracy, the armed forces and police accountable?  
7. How to empower people and make local government more effective in delivering 
services?  
8. How to control corruption and greed systematically by strengthening an independent 
judiciary and enforcement?  
9. How to reform the educational system so that productive and politically aware 
citizenship is the end result?  
10. How to reduce poverty through overall human and sustainable development so that 
the poor can participate meaningfully in the overall development process?  
 
5.6 Strategic Steps for Checking Crony Capitalism and Building an Environment 
for Democracy  
Undoubtedly, some of the steps that are being taken currently--- particularly, the anti-
corruption drive--- are correct both tactically and strategically. However, the longer term 
danger for democracy is precisely that without a continuous and valid consent of the 
governed and institutions of democracy, such practices will become paternalistic at best. 
In the worst case, a degeneration into a dictatorial stance can not be ruled out. What 
exists now is a window of opportunity for beginning serious reforms with the ultimate 
goal of building a strong civil society and democratic political culture. Five areas seem 
particularly important.  
1. Deepening civil liberties while carefully defining hate speeches and clerical and other 
forms of fascism and punishing the advocates of these tendencies. The issues here are 
indeed very subtle and care must be taken to protect fundamental rights 8;  
2. Building alliances with the poor and middle peasants, workers, students and 
professionals with a platform of a justly regulated and limited market-based economy 
which will promote the social capabilities of all with equity;  
3. Protecting our national resources and infrastructure by dealing with outside influences 
and sources on the basis of popular national sovereignty;  
4. Instituting good governance practices from below and corporate governance to make 
businesses and financial firms accountable.  
5. An overhaul of the major political parties by retiring the corrupt politicians and 
bringing to the fore other honest patriotic forces.  
 
8 I am grateful to a referee for pointing out the need for emphasizing the problems of 
drawing the necessary distinctions. My recommendation is to follow a case by case 
approach to judge when there is real and present danger to some individuals or groups( 
e.g., minorities, women) posed by intolerant and violent practices of certain forces and 
then to use constitutional means to prevent the violation of rights of individuals or groups 
by intolerant and violent political groups.  
In order to do this, a clear declaration of intent by a government for national unity which 
7  
will relinquish its power to the democratic forces after a limited time is urgently required. 
Much concrete discussion needs to be focused on this particular issue.  
The remainder of this essay discusses some methodological and theoretical issues raised 
by the above discussion before concluding that the deepening of democracy is the only 
way to preserve democracy in Bangladesh in the long run.. Although such a discussion 
may seem ―merely theoretical‖ at this point, without a reasonable theory of democracy 
to guide the practice, the tragic history of the last few decades since our historic victory 
in the liberation war is likely to be repeated. In order not to squander once again a 
genuine opportunity to democratize, we must ask some deep questions about the political 
and social economy of democracy in Bangladesh.  
5.7 The Meaning of Political and Social Economy Approach and Conditions for 
Deepening Democracy  
 
In this paper by political economy we mean the classical state and civil society and their 
interactions. By social economy we mean the underlying social basis of the political 
economy including the family structure.  
Khan(1994,1998,2007) presents deep democracy as a structure in addition to formal 
democratic apparatus such that the practice of such democratic life can be reproduced 
with the basic values intact. Change is not precluded. But all such changes should deepen 
democracy, not weaken it. Deep democracy in this sense is intimately connected with 
economic and social justice.  
In order to make such a concept of economic justice tenable, however, at least a cluster of 
conditions connected with deepening democracy must be realized(Khan 1994, 1998). The 
following is a list of such cluster conditions.  
Cluster Conditions for Deep Democracy9  
9 Khan(1998)p. 101  
1. ending of economic and other status inequalities;  
2. public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, internationalism, and 
individuality;  
3. adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, as well as for children, the 
handicapped, the aged, and others not able to work in order to promote equality of 
capability;  
4. respect for and articulation of differences in public life and within parties;  
5. downward democratic congruence of and within ordinary social institutions, including 
work place democracy;  
6. debate over the history and future of the movement- the nature of deep democracy – in 
neighborhood assemblies and schools  
7. cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, strikes, and other acts of protest on major 
public issues; 8  
8. integration of local and national leaders into features of ordinary economic and 
political life and creation of arenas for criticism;  
9. curtailment of all direct political intervention in the arts, religion, and personal life;  
10.establishment of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral review 
bodies;  
11. diversity of perspective in communications and education;  
12. use of differential, serial referenda on central issues;  
13. public funding of issue-oriented committees as well as parties;  
14. takeover of some security and civil judicial functions by neighborhood or regional 
democratic associations; abolition of centralized, especially secret police powers and 
units;  
15. universal public service, military or community; restructuring of armed forces in a 
defensive, civilian-oriented direction; removal of authoritarianism of rank and status, and 
institution of democratic unit organization, allowing serious discussion of policy;  
16. proportional representation of parties;  
17. abolition of patriarchy;  
18. adoption of democratic child-rearing practices;  
19. full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups;  
20. full freedom of diverse cultural expression;  
21. encouragement of the arts and varying modes of expression so that every individual 
can experience and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating discourse;  
22. practice of radical forms of individual and group subjectivity leading to what Guattari 
has termed the molecular revolution10;  
10As one referee pointed out, this term requires further clarification.The term molecular( 
introduced by Guattari and used by him and Deleuze among others for their critique of 
orthodox psychoanalysis) here refers to the micro-transformations that are necessary at 
the individual level. In particular, the formation of psychological processes and 
personality types open to nonauthoritarian and democratic ways of behavior must take 
place at the individual level. But these processes themselves can be realized only if 
appropriate social institutions are functioning over a significant period.  
11 For other related psychological perspectives, please see Cohen(1994), 
Deleuze and  
23. adoption of technology and innovation systems which will reinforce the conditions 
above, rather than undercutting them.  
A note on item 22 above on creating a new democratic subject is perhaps necessary. 
Gilbert(1990) refers to Kohut‘s theory of individuality.Khan(1998) introduced both a 
critical poststructuralist approach and also the perspectives of child and developmental 
psychologists. Frame(2007) and Frame and Khan (2007) refer to, among others, Victor 
Frankl‘s work on logotherapy. Frankl bases much of his theory on clinical observations, 
but the original impetus came from his experience in a Nazi concentration camp where he 
was a prisoner and observed both the tormentors and the tormented. While the camp 
offered indeed a life or death situational experiment, it can be argued less starkly that 
‗living well‘ requires a will to meaning and the fulfilment of this will to some degree. 11 
9  
Guattari(1977;1986;1987), Derrida(1966;1981), 
Guattari(1984),Gilbert(1990),Hegel(1952;1991),Khan(1992;1994;1998;2006;2
007), Kristeva(1974), Lacan(1975), Lear(1990),Norris(1990), 
Nietszhe(1969), Hasan(1982;1987),Sherman(undated), Wallwork(1991) among 
others.  
12 Sen and Nussbaum, as cited by Khan(1998)p. 95. These capabilities can be connected 
to rights as well. I have tried to do so in my essay, ―Women‘s rights as human rights‖ 
which takes a social capabilities approach to rights.  
It may also be useful to clarify and elaborate upon the idea of social capabilities which 
are also intimately related to rights (see footnote 9 below) in condition 3 above. We can 
summarize following Nussbaum and Sen and give a social interpretation of all the 
capabilities as in Khan(1998):  
Summary of Social Capabilities12  
1. Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as possible.  
2. Being able to be courageous.  
3. Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction.  
4. Being able to move from place to place.  
5. Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasurable 
experiences.  
6. Being able to use the five senses.  
7. Being able to imagine.  
8. Being able to think and reason.  
9. Being acceptably well-informed.  
10. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves.  
11. Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude.  
12. Being able to form a conception of the good.  
13. Capability to choose; ability to form goals, commitments, values.  
14. Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one‘s own life.  
15. Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction.  
16. Being capable of friendship.  
17. Being able to visit and entertain friends.  
18. Being able to participate in the community.  
19. Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice.  
20. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of 
nature.  
21. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
22. Being able to live one‘s own life and nobody else‘s.  
23. Being able to live in one‘s very own surroundings and context. 10  
24. Capability to have self-respect.  
25. Capability to appear in public without shame.  
26. Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural 
possibilities.  
27. Ability to achieve valuable functionings.  
As Crocker(1995) correctly points out, we can facilitate this ordering by requiring that 
―… it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to ‗infuse‘ but not 
‗organize‘ the other virtues.‖ Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with that of Sen. 
Sen and Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points. For Sen, the bodily capabilities and 
functionings are intrinsically good and not, as they are in some dualistic theories of the 
good life, merely instrumental means to other (higher) goods. In interpreting Aristotle, 
Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily functionings that are chosen and intentional, for 
instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form part of a reason-
guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion and other "functioning 
of the bodily system in sleep."  
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items such as ―being able to have attachments to 
things and persons outside ourselves‖ and ―being able to live with concern for and in 
relation to animals, plants and the world of nature,‖ for which Sen has no counterparts. 
These items are welcome features. Item eight, ―ecological virtue,‖ is an especially 
important addition to Nussbaum's outlook. In a period when many are exploring ways of 
effecting a convergence between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is 
important that an essentially anthropocentric ethic ―make room‖ for respect for other 
species and for ecological systems. Worth considering is whether Nussbaum's 
―ecological virtue‖ is strong enough. Perhaps it should be formulated to read: ―Being 
able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as intrinsically 
valuable.‖ Item nine injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the 
―spirit of seriousness.‖ What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's list, 
their absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete texture often displayed 
in Nussbaum's descriptions? One hypothesis is that the differences are due to Nussbaum's 
greater attention to the limits, vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence. Further, it 
may be that Nussbaum's richer conception of human beings derives from ―making use 
of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific intellect.‖ On the other hand, 
Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a virtue that enables him to find common 
ground with Rawls and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which 
moral agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves, as ends-in-
themselves.  
Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central 
importance. One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another. At 
most, one can do so in a very limited way. They cannot be reduced to a common measure 
such as utility.  
As Crocker(1991a,b) points out, ―capability ethic‖ has implications for freedom, 11  
rights and justice going far beyond simple distribution of income considerations. If one 
accepts the capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it 
follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of 
the impact of economic policies.  
In evaluating any policy regime – for instance international financial regimes and 
national economic policies under globalization in Bangladesh – from this perspective, not 
only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions 
regarding human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain 
things. Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by itself would mean very little 
if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits. Worse yet, if markets and other institutions 
led to phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased unemployment, reduced 
consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups such as women and 
minorities, then they would not even be weakly equitable global economic structures. On 
the contrary, under such circumstances, the global markets and other financial institutions 
would be strongly inequitable from the capability perspective, and violate some basic 
human rights in particular.  
The premise from which we must begin then is that the aim of any sane, progressive 
socio-economic system in Bangladesh must go beyond the blind accumulation of capital 
or industrial and financial development at all costs. The goal of a just political and social 
economy is to guarantee each individual‘s freedom or ability to live the kind of life they 
have reasons to choose. The ‗social capabilities‘ mentioned above can be construed as 
the general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, maintained, nurtured 
and developed.13 Capabilities are economic, but they are also political, social, 
psychological/spiritual, and mental. Further, no one capability can be simply substituted 
for another; one cannot substitute the capability of political freedom, or the capability to 
engage in meaningful work, with the capability to maintain a certain standard of 
consumption. A deeply democratic society must take into account all forms of 
capabilities without the sacrifice of some over others.  
13As interpreted by Khan (1998). Technology, Development and Democracy. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK. p. 95. Here, Khan emphasizes the 
irreducibly social nature of certain capabilities.  
The point here is not to emphasize one form of political, economic or social institution 
above all others, but to draw attention to the variety of alternative institutions that could 
help to positively develop the social capabilities of members in a deeply democratic 
society which can also draw from the concrete cultural strengths of each particular 
society.. Against the pessimists we must pose concretely the possibilities of building 
institutions for enhancing the social capabilities in Bangladesh beginning with the 12  
indigenous strengths of Bangalee society which were mentioned earlier.  
5.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusions  
We have summarized our approach to deep democracy from the political and social 
economy perspective above. It is now clear that in Bangladesh, the crucial problem of 
deepening democracy as a set of practices over time must be given priority. Our hope is 
that the above considerations can guide the practical agenda in Bangladesh in the future.  
In this chapter an attempt has been made to offer a strategic view of the current crisis and 
problems of democracy in Bangladesh. Needless to say, such an attempt can only be a 
preliminary and tentative one, given the complexity and historical roots of the problem of 
democracy in Bangladesh. To summarize, without being exhaustive, a set of five point 
strategic principles was presented. These are:  
1.Deepening civil liberties while carefully defining and punishing hate speeches and 
clerical and other forms of fascism;  
2.Building alliances with the peasants, workers, students and professionals with a 
platform of a justly regulated and limited market-based economy which will promote the 
social capabilities of all with equity;  
3.Protecting our national resources and infrastructure by dealing with outside influences 
and sources on the basis of popular national sovereignty;  
4.Instituting good governance practices from below and corporate governance to make 
businesses and financial firms accountable.  
5.An overhaul of the major political parties by retiring the corrupt politicians and 
bringing to the fore other honest patriotic forces.  
These considerations point towards the building of a movement for the gradual deepening 
of democracy in Bangladesh. Our approach here makes a distinction between formal 
aspects of democracy and the deeper structural aspects. In order for democracy in 
Bangladesh or anywhere for that matter, to be deep, democratic practices have to become 
institutionalized in such a way that they become part of normal life in a democratic 
society. This essay has also argued that despite serious problems and setbacks, there are 
resources within Bangladesh that can combine the historical and cultural tendencies 
towards democracy and social and political forces fighting for democracy with allies 
everywhere to build the kind of strategic alliances that can move us towards democracy 
in practice. Deep Democracy and economic justice for Bangladesh, therefore, can be 
presented as a coherent set of positive and realistic requirements. These are integral to the 
need for the ordinary citizens‘ rational autonomy in every sphere of their lives. The 
cluster conditions we give together with the social capabilities perspective offer a way of 
defending and advancing the justification for deepening democracy in Bangladesh 
beyond the crisis-driven solutions currently on offer. 13  
Appendix  
Strong Democratic Program for the Revitalization of Citizenship14  
14 Barber p. 307  
1. A national system of neighborhood assemblies of from one to five thousand citizens; 
these would initially have only deliberative functions but would eventually have local 
legislative competence as well.  
2. A national civic communications cooperative to regulate and oversee the civic use of 
new telecommunications technology and to supervise debate and discussion of 
referendum issues.  
3. A civic videotext service and a civic education postal act to equalize access to 
information and promote the full civic education of all citizens.  
4. Experiments in decriminalization and informal lay justice by an engaged citizenry.  
5. A national initiative and referendum process permitting popular initiatives and 
referenda on congressional legislation, with a multichoice format and two stage voting 
plan.  
6. Experimental electronic balloting, initially for education and polling purposes only, 
under the supervision of the Civic Communications Cooperative.  
7. Selective local elections to local office by lottery, with pay incentives.  
8. Experiments with an internal voucher system for selected schools, public housing 
projects, and transportation systems.  
9. A program of universal citizen service, including military option for all citizens.  
10. Public sponsorship of local volunteer programs in ‗common work‘ and ‗common 
action.‘  
11. Public support of experiments in workplace democracy, with public institutions as 
models for economic alternatives.  
12. A new architecture of civic and public space. 14 15  
Ch. 6  
Conclusions 16  
Globalization has obviously had some positive impacts such as the transfer of 
technology, raising of productivity in specific sectors, and the improvement of the living 
standard of some people in developing and developed countries. However, current type of 
globalization generally, while benefiting certain regions or groups, is marginalizing and 
distressing the vulnerable and disadvantaged regions and people. This type of corporate-
led globalization is also forging imbalances among different human needs by privileging 
the acquisition of material wealth over human and spiritual values, resulting in violence, 
alienation and despair. The protests against globalization reflect all these paradoxes.  
In today's global economy, the importance of raw materials and low skilled labor is 
declining while skilled labor and knowledge, particularly in the field of 
telecommunication and computer technology, are becoming increasingly important. This 
may put poor nations that are the major exporters of primary commodities and low skilled 
labor at a disadvantageous position.  
Globalization imposes the rules and discipline of the global market on governments and 
nation states and thus limits the effectiveness of developing countries' national policy, 
including fiscal and monetary policy. As noted by Gilpin earlier,  
If a country restricts its money supply in order to fight inflation, the consequent rise in 
the domestic interest rate causes an inflow of capital that then defeats the original policy 
objectives and raises the exchange rate. …[I]t is impossible to keep the pursuit of 
domestic objectives separate from the stability of the international economy and 
monetary values.15  
15 Gilpin (1987: P. 145)  
16 Falk (1997),p.19, See also Khan(2004b).  
The other negative impact of globalization is its effect on income inequality. As 
explained earlier, globalization has a tendency to increase income inequality between 
nations as well as individuals and regions. Falk summarizes the opinion of many others 
when he states  
…globalization as historical process is occurring within an international order that 
exhibits gross inequalities of every variety, thereby concentrating the benefits of growth 
upon already advantaged sectors with and among societies and worsening the relative and 
absolute condition of those already most disadvantaged .16  
There is also some justifiable concern, given the concentration of economic 17  
activities and wealth in tripolar regions (North America, Europe, East Asia and the 
Pacific), that the flow of resources to other developing countries may decline, 
exacerbating the financial and economic problems of vast areas such as sub-Saharan 
Africa. While one may see globalization and regionalization as inevitable in today's 
environment, there is an urgent need to address the socio-economic problems that arise as 
a consequence of a global market economy.  
In this book, I have emphasized that the adverse effects of globalization should be 
addressed within the conceptual framework of a just global economy. The suggested 
conceptual approach for this is the capabilities approach. From this perspective any 
movement towards a just global economy will require considerable redistribution of 
global wealth and power. In particular, it will require the currently powerful countries to 
surrender part of their sovereignty to new international organizations which can promote 
global welfare by addressing the asymmetries between the developed and developing 
countries in a timely and equitable manner. The proposed global Tobin tax is one 
example of how some problems of global finance can be addressed multilaterally. If the 
proceeds from this tax can be used to finance development that will enhance the 
capabilities of the people of LDCs so much the better. 17  
17 See (Ul Haq, et.als. (1996)  
However, the current state of affairs does not hold out much hope for either the adoption 
of a Tobin tax or its benevolent use for development to occur in the near future. In the 
mean time, it is in the interest of the developing countries to exercise whatever relative 
autonomy they have for independent action at the level of a single country, and concerted 
effort at the regional level, to mitigate the adverse effects of a fractured globalization. 
Such limited responses cannot be wholly effective, but are much to be preferred to the 
policy paralysis that seems to have been induced by an uncritical adoption of the 
dominant discourse of globalization. Ultimately, a just global order based on a 
transparent rule-based trading system and global financial architecture can enhance both 
efficiency and equity; but moving in that direction will require the willingness of all the 
parties--- or at least the major developed and developing countries--- to cooperate within 
the framework presented here.  
If the main argument advanced in this book is correct, the global financial markets in 
particular need monitoring and a proper global financial architecture needs to be erected 
for both efficiency and equity reasons. From the efficiency side the argument ---- in a 
world of undiversifiable systemic risks---- has been quite clearly one of exercising 
prudence through appropriate national and international institutional arrangements that 
can formulate and implement policies better than in the past. On the equity side, the 
foregoing argument based on the capabilities approach would lead towards creating 
institutions and policies that protect not just creditors, but also the ordinary citizens. In 
particular, careful attention must be paid to the problems of the disadvantaged and the 
vulnerable groups. Adequate social safety nets must be in place before the crisis, and 
swift response after the crisis to meet their urgent needs must be ensured. A more 
democratic decision making before the crisis could better realize such administrative 
structures. Once again, good governance at all levels is essential. If the 21st century is to 
be safer with a more civilized global 18  
society then these democratic imperatives must be heeded along with the technical advice 
that economists can at times give.  
To summarize the concrete argument from a strategic perspective for deepening 
democracy in Bangladesh under globalization and crisis:  
A set of five point strategic principles was presented. These are:  
1.Deepening civil liberties while carefully defining and punishing hate speeches and 
clerical and other forms of fascism;  
2.Building alliances with the peasants, workers, students and professionals with a 
platform of a justly regulated and limited market-based economy which will promote the 
social capabilities of all with equity;  
3.Protecting our national resources and infrastructure by dealing with outside influences 
and sources on the basis of popular national sovereignty;  
4.Instituting good governance practices from below and corporate governance to make 
businesses and financial firms accountable.  
5.An overhaul of the major political parties by retiring the corrupt politicians and 
bringing to the fore other honest patriotic forces.  
These considerations point towards the building of a movement for the gradual deepening 
of democracy in Bangladesh. Our approach here makes a distinction between formal 
aspects of democracy and the deeper structural aspects. In order for democracy in 
Bangladesh or anywhere for that matter, to be deep, democratic practices have to become 
institutionalized in such a way that they become part of normal life in a democratic 
society. Globalization under imperial hegemony is actually a big roadblock to this path. It 
is folly to look towards imperialist governments and the multilateral donors to build 
democracy for us. This not to say that we should not learn from their experiences---
positive and negative. In particular, there is a lot to learn from the parliamentary and 
social democracies. Some principles of deepening democracy are at work in the 
Scandinavian social democracies in particular. Fortunately and importantly for our 
argument, these are not imperialist countries.  
This book has also argued that despite serious problems and setbacks, there are resources 
within Bangladesh that can combine the historical and cultural tendencies towards 
democracy and social and political forces fighting for democracy with allies everywhere 
to build the kind of strategic alliances that can move us towards democracy in practice. 
Deep Democracy and economic justice for Bangladesh, therefore, can be presented as a 
coherent set of positive and realistic requirements. These are integral to the need for the 
ordinary citizens‘ rational autonomy in every sphere of their lives. The cluster conditions 
we give together with the social capabilities perspective offer a way of defending and 
advancing the justification for deepening democracy in Bangladesh beyond the crisis-
driven solutions currently on offer. A different, non-fractured and non-dominati18ng 
globalization will 19  
make the tasks for small countries like Bangladesh easier. However, no such prospects 
are in sight just now. We must prepare for the long road to deepening democracy and 
establishing a just society without waiting for the rest of the world to change first. 20  
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